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a will, which he quite properly shows does not, in its essential nature, differ from other contracts. Testamentary capacity is developed with an unusual wealth of detail, particularly in connection with questions of evidence. Not so good is the chapter on mistake, fraud and undue influence. In connection with the first two of these, a brief distinction between fraud or mistake in the *factum* and fraud or mistake in the inducement would have added greatly to the author's clearness and accuracy. In Chapter 8, dealing with the execution of wills, the author is specially to be commended on the sanity with which many perplexing problems are treated and on his taking the liberal and progressive view of the statutory formalities necessary to the validity of a will. Examples of this last spirit are found on page 209, upholding the signing by another on behalf of a witness at the request of the witness, and on page 215, supporting the broad doctrine (sometimes called the doctrine of *Cunningham v. Cunningham*, 80 Minn. 180, 83 N. W. 58, 51 L. R. A. 642, 81 Am. St. Rep. 256) as to what constitutes a signing by a witness in the presence of the testator. Chapter 9, on the revocation and republication of wills, is also well done, though the definition of republication and the distinction between republication and revival are not altogether accurate. The discussion, however, of the most important problem under the revival of wills, the effect of the revocation of a revoking will, is one of the best in the book.

ARMISTEAD M. DOBIE.

BANKRUPTCY FORMS, ANNOTATED, 2nd ed., by Marshall S. Hagar and Thomas Alexander. (Albany: Matthew Bender & Company, 1916, pp. liv, 909.)

In addition to more than three hundred forms covering every need on that score, this volume includes a well indexed compilation of the Bankruptcy Act, the General Orders and the bankruptcy rules of all the most important districts, together with such a novel and convenient feature as a time table of procedure, showing the time allowed for the performance of various acts required in practice. Excellent editorial notes, very careful and complete annotations, cross references and accurate indexing render this easily the best work of its kind and well-nigh indispensable to the practitioner.

The first edition of this work was published shortly after the amendments of 1910 to the Bankruptcy Act, when the radical changes in the law were little understood and before the practice thereunder had become settled. Since that time much progress has been made in bankruptcy administration; the law has become better understood and appreciated and its machinery brought to work more smoothly; the Supreme Court has, in a number of notable decisions, cleared up many mooted questions and pointed the way to a broad interpretation of the statute. It is certain, therefore, that this edition will retain its value longer than ever before, instead of going rapidly out of date under constant changes in the law by amendment or interpretation.

GEORGE B. EAGER, JR.